Ideas from 'Reference and Necessity' by Robert C. Stalnaker [1997], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ways a World Might Be' by Stalnaker,Robert C. [OUP 2003,0-19-925149-5]].

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

16405

To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

16407

Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

16397

If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways

16398

Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries

16399

Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

16396

Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation

16408

Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

16406

If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

16404

In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics

16403

'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics

16401

To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true